Kate Sjovold
Dr. Lookingbill
Geography Capstone
12 December 2020
Oil, Climate Change, and Human Rights: A Case Study of Norway with Comparative
Analysis

Abstract
The Arctic region is simultaneously facing profound, negative ecological impacts of
climate change and is also subject to expanding oil and gas exploration and extraction. Facing a
critical decision involving Arctic oil expansion, Norway is contending with its position as a
global leader in the environmental movement and its historic and continued economic reliance
on the oil and gas industry. This research contextualizes Norway within the Arctic region,
discusses Norway as a petroleum exporting country, and addresses how value and identity play a
role in environmental policy creation. Recent human rights-based climate change litigation in
Norway, People v. Arctic Oil, suggests that Norway’s expansion of Arctic oil production
constitutes a human rights violation, violating the right to a safe environment and the right to life,
based on the negative impacts of increasing carbon emissions. This litigation is exposing
Norway’s paradoxical relationship to environmental responsibility and calls for real
considerations of responsibility and action in regard to climate change. As a comparative
analysis, this research examines rights-based climate change litigation in other parts of Western
Europe and the US. Staving off dangerous climate change is a shared global responsibility, but
individual nations must take action to address and reduce their own production of carbon
emissions. Rights-based climate change litigation acts as an opportunity for citizens to advocate
for stricter emissions regulations and more progressive, immediate climate change action on the
grounds that climate change represents a real threat to human rights.

Arctic Context: Climate Change and Oil Production
The Arctic region is simultaneously facing profound negative impacts of climate change
and contending with extensive oil and gas exploration and development. The Arctic region is
experiencing warming at an alarming rate, about double the rate of the global average with
record-breaking surface air temperature warming causing uncharacteristic, extreme oceanic and
land conditions (NOAA, 2020). Global warming and climate change are fundamentally altering
the Arctic ecosystem. Key impacts include rising surface air temperatures, changes to the
hydrologic cycle, increases in precipitation and humidity, diminishing sea ice thickness and
surface area, decreased snow coverage, and warming permafrost layers (Box et al., 2019).
Further, these changes are altering nutrient flows from land into coastal areas, causing

phenological mismatch between flowering plants and pollinating species, increasing carbon
cycling, causing a change in animal distribution, increasing shrub biomass, increasing wildfire
incidence, and increasing conversion of land ecosystems to aquatic ecosystems (Box et al.,
2019). This rapid and intense change is known as “Arctic Amplification,” with the effects of
climate change being seen and felt profoundly right now (Stephen, 2018). Effects like sea and
land ice melt will compound climate change through changes in albedo, with newly exposed
ocean and land surfaces absorbing more solar radiation and heat. Thawing permafrost will
similarly amplify climate change by releasing carbon dioxide and methane back into the
atmosphere.
While the Arctic circle accounts for just 6% of Earth’s surface, it represents the largest
geographic region for significant undiscovered petroleum reserves (USGS, 2008). Located
almost entirely in offshore reserves, it is estimated that more than 90 billion barrels of oil and 44
million barrels of liquified natural gas, or about 22% of the world’s undiscovered reserves are
located in the Arctic region (USGS, 2008). With these significant reserves yet to be exploited
and continued global demand for fossil fuels despite climate change, Russia, Canada, the US,
and Norway, and to a lesser extent Iceland and Greenland, are all the major players (Figure 1) in
the race for Arctic oil development (Harsem et al., 2011; Copeland & Watkins, 2013). Russia
began off-shore Arctic oil development in 2014 and Norway in 2016. The US has been involved
in Alaskan Arctic oil production since the early 2000’s although the scale is limited and
expansion is controversial (Shapovalova, 2020). Canada and Greenland, the other potential offshore Arctic oil producers, do not have any active off-shore sites yet. As for natural gas
production, Norway is the only nation with a natural gas operation in the offshore Arctic region
(Shapovalova, 2020).
Climate change is actually making Arctic petroleum exploration, production, and
transportation easier than ever before. Oil spills in the Arctic region are incredibly difficult to
clean up, particularly because it is nearly impossible to clean up oil spills that occur in icecovered waters using existing technology (Nuka, 2015). As such, it is becoming more feasible
for companies to explore and produce oil in the Arctic with less risk involved due to declines in
sea ice coverage. With major declines in Arctic sea ice, there are also larger ice-free time periods
and areas that have opened up new trade routes or made existing trade routes accessible for
longer time spans (Harsem et al., 2013). With this increased navigability, Arctic oil trade can be
expanded to new markets, especially in Asia, and will be faster and cheaper than before
(Sengupta, 2017). Conditions in the Arctic are still challenging and increase costs for oil
production, but the draw to exploit untapped fossil fuel reserves remains strong. Because Arctic
oil extraction requires large-scale, specialized weather-safe infrastructure and continued longterm investments, once new oil production in the Arctic has begun, it will sustain and increase oil
production for the long-term in order to maximize profits (Shapovalova, 2020). Arctic oil
production is expected to grow significantly even as European demand falls with stricter climate

goals being implemented. The supply of Arctic oil will likely shift to other regions with less
stringent emissions policies (Shapovalova, 2020). Overall, exploration and development of
Arctic oil reserves is an ongoing process with plenty of opportunity as well as controversy. The
Arctic is an incredibly sensitive ecological region experiencing major impacts from climate
change and yet it holds vast quantities of untapped petroleum resources that when burned, will
contribute to increased climate change. At the same time, oil development has been and remains
critical to the economic strength of many Arctic nations. Oil and gas remain major energy
sources globally and Arctic oil development represents a major opportunity, but one that comes
with considerable responsibilities as well.
Norway’s Environmental Context Grounded in Identity
This case study centers on the position of Norway as a nation with a strong global
environmental, climate action leadership capacity that remains economically dependent on the
oil and gas industry. Norway has established itself as a nation committed to aggressive, domestic
climate change action, yet continues to exploit its vast oil and gas reserves for export,
contributing to global carbon emissions. Norway is perceived as an environmentally and socially
responsible country, but remains one of the largest petroleum exporters in the world. By many
accounts, Norway is truly a highly socially and environmentally progressive country. Norwegian
identity is grounded in principles of community, cooperation, ethics, and a respect and love for
nature. To understand Norway’s position in this complex and paradoxical relationship to
environmental stewardship it helps to understand Norwegian identity as rooted in a particular
value system and physical geography.
Norway is a highly economically stable, safe, equitable, and socially supportive nation
with a strong welfare system in place to politically solidify these principles (Eriksen, 2013).
Grounded in its political system, Norway places a high value on “trust, accountability,
democracy” and “egalitarianism” (Eriksen, 2013, 13). Norwegians highly value the democratic
process, which is generally transparent, accountable, and responsive to the people’s needs
(Skinner, 2012). Norwegian values can also be described as “postmaterialist” and emphasize
equality, morality, environmental protection, and quality of life (Skinner, 2012). Norway is
recognized as a highly cooperative and community-oriented society, described by the Norwegian
word dugnad, which means “working together for the common good” (Stoltenberg, 2009). These
terms above are frequently used to describe Norwegian values, and particularly influence the
structure of Norway’s political and economic systems which are largely democratically socialist.
Norwegian values and identity are also highly connected to nature. There is a strong
history and value placed on the protection and romanticization of nature. Norwegians value
nature highly and associate rural life, life lived in nature, nature exploration with life satisfaction,
quality of life, happiness, and peace (Skinner, 2012). The Norwegian “propensity to roam freely

in the woods and fields and the mountains” is a very real sentiment and one that hints at how
interconnected their value system, their identity is to nature itself (Skinner, 2012). Aspects of
Norwegian identity are grounded in physical geography. In Northern Norway, two characteristic
landscape images emerge: one of coastal fishermen and another of indigenous nomadic Saami
reindeer herders (Jones, 2008). The intense sea and fjords and the mountainous Norwegian
highlands are distinctive geographical features that construe Norwegian identity. These particular
landscapes are central to the national identity. Further, because of this identity, “environmental
threats to these landscapes implicitly [come] to be presented as threats to national...identity”
(Jones, 2008, 284). Combining Norwegian values of trust and transparency with ideas of nature
protection, Norwegians tend to acknowledge that climate change is one of the most pressing
global issues and they treat climate science data from the IPCC as “authoritative,” recognized
through personal experience with the “rapid, visible, and alarming” effects of climate change in
the Arctic Nordic region (Eckersley, 2015, 12). Put simply, Norway has a lived understanding of
climate change within its borders and takes climate change as a potential attack on its national
identity and value system. That being said, Norway has incredibly strong domestic climate action
policies and is a strong advocate for international cooperation on climate action goals.

Norway’s Domestic Climate Policy and the Oil Paradox
Norway’s domestic environmental policies reflect Norway’s projected cultural identity
and value system that is grounded in nature, community, responsibility, and ethics. Norway has
one of the most ambitious carbon emissions policies, with a policy goal outlined in Norway’s
2007 Climate White Paper of decreasing emissions by 30% by the end of 2020 and reaching
carbon neutrality by 2050 (Eckersley, 2015). These policies were passed in 2008 by the
Norwegian Parliament with the backing of six out of Norway’s seven political parties, signaling
an early and collective national agreement to become a global leader in climate action
(Eckersley, 2015). Under the Paris Agreement, Norway’s goal moved to 40% domestic
emissions reductions by 2030, with aims to become a carbon neutral, “low emissions” society by
2050 (Down & Erickson, 2017). To achieve domestic emissions reductions, Norway has
implemented a high carbon tax, a carbon tax on the oil and gas industries, an emissions trading
program with the EU, an incentives program for hybrid and electric vehicles, and investment in
carbon capture technology (Eckersley, 2015). Further, Norway has a goal of selling only electric
cars by 2025, donates heavily to a global deforestation prevention program, and generates all of
its electricity from hydropower (Sengupta, 2017). Norway has pursued aggressive emissions
reductions primarily in the transportation and electricity sectors and has been very successful in
achieving its domestic goals. Norway is also a strong advocate for international climate
agreements and recognizes how wealthy, western, industrialized nations have contributed to the
bulk of historic carbon emissions and must be the ones to drastically decrease their own
emissions and help poorer countries achieve low-emissions economic development. So not only

has Norway proven itself to be committed to domestic climate policy, but Norway is also a
strong proponent of international climate action.
Distinctively, Norway’s exceptional domestic climate policy success does not reflect its
export of oil and gas. Domestically, Norway has incredibly low greenhouse gas emissions. Of
those domestic emissions, about a quarter are attributable to fossil fuel production in the country
(Down & Erickson, 2017). Norway actually scored 9th in global 2020 Environmental
Performance Index rankings, which looks at 32 performance indicators to gauge a country’s
environmental health, performance, and progress in reaching global environmental policy goals
(Yale, 2020). Norway received exceptionally high scores in air quality, drinking water quality,
waste management, pollution emissions, and climate change. However, the high marks in
emissions and climate change categories are strictly accounting for domestic emissions, not
including exported oil and natural gas (Yale, 2020). The climate impact of those petroleum
exports is large. Emissions from Norway’s petroleum exports amount to ten times the country’s
domestic carbon emissions (Sengupta, 2017). With goals of becoming carbon neutral by 2050,
Norway explicitly excludes emissions that will come from burning exported oil and gas that it
produced. While Norway has numerous notable domestic climate policies, the same White
Papers that mandated emissions reductions targets also indicate that oil and gas production will
continue and expand to exploit new reserves (Eckersley, 2013). Norway’s increasing production
also does not mean that production elsewhere is decreasing and any increases in supply will
increase consumption, which will contribute to rising greenhouse gas emissions into the
atmosphere no matter where the exported petroleum ends up (Down & Erickson, 2017). The
simultaneous ambition of its climate policies and its maintained commitment to the fossil fuel
industry presents a challenging dynamic.
Norway is very aware of its paradoxical position as a leader in climate action and a leader
in oil and gas exports. Norway is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, with incredibly
high standards of living and a strong social support system, but this economic wellbeing was
achieved largely because of its lucrative oil and gas industry. Norway began oil exploration in
the mid-1960’s and over the past five decades, the petroleum industry has played a critical role in
strengthening Norway’s economy and allowing for a flourishing welfare state system
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2020). Although Norway is a relatively small oil and gas
producer, it is a major oil and gas exporter with global significance. Norway is the 15th largest
oil producer globally, the third largest gas exporter globally, and supplies about a quarter of the
EU’s gas demands (NPD, 2020). Economically, the oil industry plays a crucial role in Norway.
With high oil prices in the 1980’s, oil production accounted for about 20% of Norway’s GDP
(Holden, 2013). The petroleum industry now accounts for 12% of Norway’s GDP, 10% of the
State’s revenues, and 36% of total exports (NDP, 2020). Exploiting oil reserves has allowed
Norway to achieve a high GDP per capita, with GDP per capita growing from below the OECD
average in 1970 to 70% higher than the OECD average by 2010, one of the highest in the world

(Holden, 2013). Specifically, about 20% of Norway’s increase in GDP per capita since 1973 can
be attributed to its exploitation of petroleum resources, a significant contribution (Mideksa,
2013). Further, Norway views its oil wealth as a resource that should benefit everyone in
Norwegian society, including future generations. Norway has thus adopted petroleum policies
that reflect that sentiment. Norway imposes a major 78% profit tax on the oil and gas industry,
the government has direct ownership through the State’s Direct Financial Interest portfolio, and
the government also has two-thirds ownership in Equinor, the largest Norwegian petroleum firm
(Holden, 2013). Government cash flow from these investments is high, a major source of
economic revenue for government usage (Figure 2).
The government is directly involved in managing oil resources and planning how to
spread the benefits of oil production throughout Norwegian society. Norway recognizes that the
end of the oil era is inevitable and not far off. Recognizing the economic difficulties of the end of
oil and the current prosperity of oil wealth, the government has created a savings fund for future
generations known as the Oil Fund, which is also the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world
(Eckersley, 2013). This fund will help future generations achieve a smooth economic and social
transition away from fossil fuels. It is undeniable that oil and gas production has strengthened
Norway’s economy and helped it become a thriving, wealthy nation. It is actually precisely
because Norway has a strong wealth base and maintains such high standards of living that
Norway has a very high adaptive capacity and is well poised to transition away from fossil fuels.
Compared to other oil producing countries, Norway is better able to develop and adapt
alternatives to the oil and gas industry while maintaining a stable economy and society (Down &
Erickson, 2017). Eventually, Norway will have to fully transition away from fossil fuels either
from a climate standpoint or because the resources are depletable. Due to the fossil fuel
industry’s economic importance in terms of revenue and employment, there is a critical need for
a “managed reduction in supply” to enable a smooth transition away from oil and gas to other
sectors (Shapovalova, 2020). Norway should be proactive in finding new revenue sources and
industries to develop that do not rely on resource extraction so that they can ensure economic and
social stability for generations to come. This is a tension Norway must contend with, the need to
move beyond the fossil fuel era on its own terms. Norway is currently directly confronting this
exact environmental stewardship and petroleum industry paradox in its legal system.
Norway’s Human Rights-Based Climate Case: People v. Arctic Oil
The Norwegian Supreme Court is currently hearing a case brought forward by
environmental groups Greenpeace Nordic Association and Nature & Youth arguing that
Norway’s continued licensing of Arctic oil exploration and development constitutes a violation
of citizens’ constitutional rights to a safe environment and fundamental right to life (Greenpeace
v. Norway, 2020). Norway has already licensed many areas in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea,
and parts of the Barents Sea, but the continued development of the Barents Sea region is the
main question presented in this case (Figure 3). The case, also referred to as People v. Arctic Oil,

is one of the most recent and potentially consequential human rights-based climate change cases
to be heard by a nation’s highest court. Originally filed in 2016, the plaintiffs argue that the 23rd
licensing round granting oil and gas companies the ability to explore for oil in the South Barents
Sea is a governmental failure to preserve citizens’ fundamental human rights (Duffy & Maxwell,
2020). That licensing round refers to when Norway granted oil companies licenses to explore for
oil on 77 acres of the Norwegian continental shelf in the South/Southeast Barents Sea, where it’s
estimated that half of the shelf’s undiscovered oil reserves are located (Libell & Kwai, 2020).
The 2016 case argued that there are three main grounds for dismissing the 23rd licensing round
as invalid: First, that issuing the licenses is a violation of Article 112 of the Norwegian
constitution, which guarantees citizens and future generations the right to a safe environment
(Supreme Court of Norway, 2020). The climate impact of continued oil expansion jeopardizes
environmental quality and contributes to climate change to the degree that it is a constitutional
violation of the right to a safe environment. Second, the continued oil expansion in the Arctic is
argued to be a violation of Article 2 in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and
Article 93 in the constitution, which both guarantee the right to life. In the same vein, it is a
violation of Article 8 in the ECHR and Article 102 in the constitution, which guarantees a right
to a private and family life (Supreme Court of Norway, 2020). And lastly, the environmental
organizations argue that there were procedural errors involved, that there was no sufficient
scientific research done to assess the impact of expanding oil and gas developing into the
South/Southeast Barents Sea (Supreme Court of Norway, 2020). The main questions before the
court center around the “geographic scope of Norway’s human rights obligations” and the
“threshold of risk required” to force Norway to take action to protect those rights (Duffy &
Maxwell, 2020).
The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 first introduced the idea of having a fundamental
right to a safe environment for present and future generations. Now, more than 110 UN member
nations have a constitutional clause recognizing people’s right to a safe environment, although
they have varying degrees of state responsibility and enforceability (Boyd & Orellana, 2020). In
1972, this original clause was not focused on climate change, but it now serves as a basis for our
understanding of climate change as a threat to human rights. Global human rights bodies have
recognized since 2008 that climate change poses an imminent threat to human rights and that
countries have an obligation to prevent climate change induced human rights violations by acting
to reduce emissions, regulate emitting activities, and promote resiliency measures. The IPCC
considers a 2°C warming the threshold for dangerous climate change impacts, with warming
beyond the 2°C limit posing catastrophic and irreversible harms (IPCC, 2018). Research
suggests that we have a slim chance of staying below 2°C of warming, particularly if global
fossil fuel usage doesn’t drastically decrease. We have already surpassed 1°C warming above
pre-industrial levels and the negative impacts, including increased intensity and/or frequency of
flooding, drought, severe storms, and wildfires, are already being felt (IPCC, 2018).
Additionally, climate change threatens to decrease agricultural productivity, destabilize staple

crop production, increase the frequency and intensity of severe weather events and wildfires,
diminish global biodiversity and ecosystem diversity (IPCC, 2018). All of these effects have real
impacts for wellbeing, like forcing the relocation of coastal communities, contributing to hunger
and famine crises, causing damage to critical infrastructure. Climate change thus threatens to
undermine not only environmental health and wellbeing, but also the physical, economic,
cultural, and social wellbeing of people globally.
Returning to the People v. Arctic Oil case at hand, the plaintiffs argued in the first
hearing that continued oil expansion is incompatible with sub-2°C warming as per the Paris
Agreement goals as discussed above. Further, they addressed the fact that the Arctic is an
environmentally sensitive region and subject to amplified climate change impacts, so it is of the
utmost importance to protect it to the highest degree possible (Greenpeace v. Norway, 2020).
While any fossil fuel production increases climate change, extraction in the Arctic is especially
risky and counterproductive. In 2018, the Oslo District Court ruled against the environmental
organizations and in favor of the Norwegian Government. The District Court emphasized that the
plaintiffs did have standing to bring forth their case as a rights-based climate change case, but
found that the Norwegian government did not infringe upon citizens’ rights to a healthy
environment or their right to life as guaranteed under the Constitution and ECHR (Greenpeace v.
Norway, 2020). In this decision, the District Court also found that emissions from exported
petroleum could not be considered and are “irrelevant” and not applicable to Article 112. The
case was successfully appealed, and in January 2020, the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower
court in that the licenses remain valid, but stated that the exported petroleum’s emissions are
indeed applicable under Article 112 (Greenpeace v. Norway, 2020). Despite acknowledging that
exported emissions should be included in our reading of the right to a safe environment, the
Court of Appeals very frustratingly decided that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a violate of
Article 112 because “it is uncertain whether and to what extent the licenses will lead to increased
greenhouse gas emissions” (Greenpeace v. Norway, 2020). To this end, the decision has been
appealed again and the Norwegian Supreme Court commenced hearings in November 2020.
The case confirms that citizens do in fact have a right to protection for climate change,
but it ultimately found that “the global consequences of climate change were beyond the scope of
the State’s obligations under the ECHR” (Duffy & Maxwell, 2020). In this sense, it seems that
Norway is rejecting responsibility and culpability for its role in creating the conditions for
climate change and its role in supplying fossil fuels that continue to generate emissions. The case
is incredibly frustrating because it counters the narrative that Norway is a global environmental
action leader and suggests that the petroleum industry is more powerful and important than
reaching global climate goals and securing citizens’ rights to a safe environment. The Norwegian
Supreme Court has yet to release its final decision in the case, but even if the court upholds the
licenses now, the arguments involved demonstrate the power of the people to bring forth future
rights-based climate change cases.

Western European Human Rights-Based Climate Litigation
The People v. Arctic Oil case is just one example of recent climate change rights-based
litigation, with some major European cases setting precedents for climate action. Perhaps the
most relevant and important recent climate change litigation comes from the Urgenda v.
Netherlands (2019) case. The Urgenda Foundation, a Dutch environmental group, sued the
Dutch government, arguing that the Netherlands is not exercising its responsibility to help
prevent global climate change and is in violation of Articles 2 and 8 (right to life and right to
family life) under the ECHR (Urgenda v. Netherlands, 2019). The court ruled that the
government has an obligation to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% of
1990 levels by the end of 2020 or else it would be evading its “duty of care” to protect the human
rights enumerated in Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR (Urgenda v. Netherlands, 2019). The case
makes it clear that no matter how minor a country’s share of global emissions, it still has an
obligation to measurably reduce its emissions to help meet global goals (Nollkaemper &
Burgers, 2020). This is one of the strongest rights-based climate change rulings and sets an
important precedent for future climate change litigation, including the Norway case.
Also highly relevant to the People v. Arctic oil case, although this was a Parliament
decision, the Danish Parliament just voted to end all future oil licensing rounds and suspend all
future oil production permits, with existing oil production in the Danish part of the North Sea set
to end by 2050 (Greenpeace International, 2020). Denmark is another large EU oil producer, so
this represents a critical policy shift for the nation and shows how they are emerging as a leader
in climate change action by imposing a hard deadline for ending oil extraction. This recent
decision stands in stark contrast to the Norwegian government’s push to continue oil licensing
and production in the environmentally sensitive Arctic region (Greenpeace International, 2020).
Norway must consider how its decision to license new oil and gas production contributes to
rising greenhouse gas emissions and that even though the vast majority is exported, they still
were still responsible for its production.
Another important case is more centered on a state’s responsibility to enact clear and
actionable mitigation plans, but also involves a human rights claim. In 2017, Friends of the Irish
Environment sued the Irish government for passing the National Mitigation Plan which they
argue is wildly unspecific and not designed to achieve short-term greenhouse gas emissions
reductions, thereby violating Ireland’s Climate Action plan, the Irish Constitution, and the
European Convention on Human Rights for its infringements upon the right to life/family life
(FIE v. Ireland, 2020). Ireland’s Climate Act specifically mandates that Ireland become a “low
carbon, climate resilient” and “environmentally sustainable economy” by 2050, which the
National Mitigation Plan recognized but failed to actually address how that would be
accomplished (Kelleher, 2020). In July 2020, the High Court of Ireland ruled in favor of FIE.
The Court found that the Act requires a specific emissions reductions plan. However, the Court

did not find standing for infringement upon human rights (FIE v. Ireland, 2020). The ruling is
significant as it signals the need for specific, actionable measures to be taken within specific time
frames to actually achieve globally agreed upon climate goals.
Although this German case has not been heard yet, the case has many similarities to the
Juliana v. US case (discussed below) as it is a youth-led, rights-based climate change case that is
currently active and does not invoke ECHR rights (Neubauer v. Germany, 2020). A group of
German youth filed a lawsuit against the German government arguing that the Federal Climate
Protection Act’s emissions reduction goals of 55% below 1990 levels by 2030 are not stringent
enough to meet sub-2°C goals as outlined in the Paris Agreement. The youth allege that this
constitutes a violation of their human rights under the German Constitution and request that the
reduction quota be increased to 70% of 1990 levels by 2030 (Neubauer v. Germany, 2020).
Again, while this case has not been decided, it is representative of the ability to push for tighter
environmental regulations as a way of securing human rights.
Not all recent European human rights-based climate cases have produced
environmentally favorable outcomes, however. Earlier this year, Switzerland’s Supreme Court
rejected an appeal by the Union of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection, maintaining that
the Swiss government did not violate human rights under the ECHR through its climate policies.
The plaintiffs maintain that Swiss environmental policy is not on track to significantly reduce
emissions consistent with sub-2°C warming goals (McDermott, 2020; Union of Swiss Senior
Women v. Switzerland, 2020). Rights-based cases are difficult to argue and do not always favor
pro-environmental outcomes. However, the fact that multiple nations now uphold that climate
change as a human rights violation is grounds for legal standing is a critical step.
United States Litigation: Juliana v. US
The United States departs from both Norway and the European on the issue of rightsbased climate change legislation in that it is incredibly challenging to bring forth a case on the
grounds of climate change representing a violation of human rights. The US has no
constitutionally guaranteed right to a safe and healthy environment and is not subject to the same
ECHR articles as invoked in many of the European cases aforementioned. In 2015, youth
plaintiffs represented by youth environmental nonprofit Our Children’s Trust filed a lawsuit
against the US government claiming that its failure to act on carbon emissions constituted a
violation of their right to life (Juliana v. US, 2020). The US has been aware for more than 5
decades that burning FF’s, releasing GHGs into the atmosphere is causing CC, endangering the
health, wellbeing, and survival of present and future generations. Yet, the government continues
to support the fossil fuel industry, has failed to adequately regulate emissions, and continuously
fails to enact progressive climate change policies despite being fully aware of the environmental,
social (ie: public health/wellbeing), and economic impacts of climate change. Moreover, the
government deliberately allows and enables fossil fuel production and combustion in spite of the

climate change evidence. The impetus for the Juliana v. US case is the approval of the Jordan
Cove LNG project in Oregon, which will be the largest source of carbon emissions in the state
and will contribute to global climate change, thereby also harming the plaintiffs (Juliana v. US,
2020). Past governmental failure to act on fossil fuel emissions has created dangerous climate
change conditions and the Juliana Plaintiffs argue that the Department of Energy’s approval of
the Jordan Cove LNG project further increases harm to the Plaintiffs. The Juliana Plaintiffs,
representing the interests of the youngest generation, assert that the US government, through its
role in causing climate change, has violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional foundational rights to
life, liberty, and property (Juliana v. US, 2020).
Following the 2020 hearing, the 9th Circuit Court ruled that Juliana plaintiffs failed to
meet the redressability requirements under Article III of the Constitution and therefore lacked
standing to bring forth their case against the federal government (Juliana v. US, 2020).
Essentially, the Court insisted that because the court’s actions alone cannot “solve global climate
change,” that this one case cannot prevent or mitigate climate change, that the plaintiff's case
must be dismissed for lack of standing (Juliana v. US, 2020). Following this frustrating ruling,
plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing. The 9th Circuit Court had ruled that Juliana plaintiffs did not
have standing, particularly on the issue of redressability. Juliana plaintiffs argue that the court
created a new redressability test that was politically motivated and argued that the case deals
with “profoundly important issues” (ie: climate change) that affect children, who cannot defend
themselves in court and have special rights (Juliana v. US, 2020). In the past few months, many
Amicus briefs were submitted on behalf of the Juliana plaintiffs, including by members of
Congress and law professors alleging the court erred in determining standing and redressability,
by public health experts detailing climate change’s impacts to children’s health, by youth
advocates citing the state’s special judicial role and duty in protecting children’s fundamental
rights, and international lawyers citing the foreign precedent set in climate litigation (Juliana v.
US, 2020). Plaintiffs continue to push the case through the legal system, but the outlook is far
from favorable.
What feels most revealing about the difference between the US climate litigation and the
European cases is how this case is argued and dismissed purely on issues of standing and
redressability. Urgenda v. Netherlands (2019) case specifically addresses how despite having a
small fraction of global emissions, the government still has a duty to reduce emissions further to
protect its citizens’ human rights in the face of climate change. The Juliana ruling is delivered
without much thought as to deeper questions of the United States’ culpability and responsibility
for the magnitude of climate change nor the government’s responsibility to protect the most
vulnerable members of society from violations of their most basic, foundational right to life.
The Juliana v. US ruling speaks to a greater issue of lack of environmental stewardship
by the federal government. At a time of critical need for more stringent emissions reductions and

progressive climate policy, the Trump Administration has rolled back more than one hundred
environmental policies and regulations in the United States (Popovich et al., 2020). In line with
the Trump Administration’s pro-industry, anti-environment stance, the Trump Administration is
set to auction off drilling rights in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge on January 6th, just two
weeks before President-Elect Joe Biden takes office (Hanlon, 2020). The area in question is 1.6
million acres on ANWR’s coastal plain, which is 8% of the reserve but still serves as a critical
habitat for vulnerable species like polar bears and other migrating wildlife (Hanlon, 2020). The
timeline for the auction has been rapidly accelerated, to the point where drilling opponents may
be able to challenge the sale based on procedural errors. The Biden Administration could also
make the permitting process hellish for oil companies even if the Trump admin pushes the
auction through (Hanlon, 2020). Ultimately this licensing auction is demonstrable of just how far
out of alignment the Trump Administration’s environmental policies are compared to the vast
majority of other Western nations.
While much of Western Europe debates the ethics of oil licensing and climate
responsibility, the Trump Administration rushes to auction off land in a protected, sensitive
environmental region before a more progressive, conscious president takes office. As political
polarization deepens in the US, there is growing disagreement along party lines about belief in
and approaches to handling climate change and environmental protection (Dunlap et al., 2016).
Amongst conservative Republicans in 2016, only 30% believed that global warming was already
occurring and just 17% believed climate change to be a serious threat in their lifetime (Dunlap et
al., 2016). On the other hand, the vast majority of liberal democrats showed strong belief in
climate change realities and viewed it as a serious risk and personal worry (Dunlap et al., 2016).
This political polarization is ideological, deeply tied to people’s personal value systems and
identity formations. This intensifying political polarization makes it incredibly difficult to pass
environmental policies that align with globally agreed upon emissions reductions goals. In
contrast to this US divide, European countries generally express less political polarization and
more consistent environmental attitudes. An overwhelming majority, 95%, of surveyed EU
citizens considered it essential to protect the environment with nearly 60% identifying climate
change as their top environmental concern (Adelle & Withana, 2008). Ultimately meeting
climate change goals is an international, cooperative effort and political polarization, particularly
in the US, as well as continued investment in fossil fuel production is compromising our
collective ability to meet these global emissions goals.
Conclusion
Climate change is the product of global industrial capitalism, based on resource
extraction and fossil fuel usage. Industrial capitalism has demanded the exploitation of resources
for the sake of development and many wealthy, western nations today have acquired their
industrialized, wealthy status from this fossil fuel extraction process. We now find ourselves at a
critical ecological threshold, where climate change is causing serious environmental damage

which is already and will continue to negatively impact human lives. The impacts of climate
change, particularly if dramatic action is not taken, will compromise young and future
generations’ rights to a safe and healthy environment and to life itself. From a human-rights
perspective, the core of the issue in the People v. Arctic oil case is that continued investment in,
continued production of fossil fuels endangers the long-term welfare for people and the planet by
contributing to climate change. Norway is in a critical moment, where it can decide to
acknowledge its responsibility as a wealthy, industrialized nation to start limiting oil production
or it can decide to continue licensing new oil developments, knowing that this action contributes
to climate change that very directly affects them as an Arctic nation. At this point, Norway is in
an incredible position to claim its role as a global climate action leader and begin seriously
transitioning away from fossil fuels. Domestically, Norway has done a remarkable job of
lowering emissions and is in a strong economic and social position to find alternative ways of
generating wealth and economic growth, outside of the petroleum industry.
The Urgenda v. Netherlands case, that recognized the State’s responsibility to reduce
emissions further to protect human rights, further solidifies the Netherlands as a climate action
leader and establishes an exciting precedent for future human-rights based climate change
litigation globally. Similarly, the Netherlands voting to cease new licensing rounds and end all
oil production by 2050 should serve as a signal to other western, industrialized nations to follow
suit, to make real actionable commitments to ending fossil fuel production in order to safeguard
the health and existence of people and a productive environment. The United States stands out
for its general failure to take responsibility for its role in climate change and to guarantee its
citizens a constitutional right to a safe and healthy environment. The United States has also failed
to legally acknowledge and address how climate change poses a major threat to human rights. As
a globally influential and powerful nation, the United States needs to develop stronger climate
change policies and act responsibly, swiftly, and cooperatively to meet global emissions targets.
The present wave of global human-rights based climate change cases represents an exciting, but
challenging, frontier for pursuing more aggressive climate action. There is truly a collective
responsibility to reduce emissions and these western, wealthy, industrialized nations must take
responsibility for strategically moving away from fossil fuels now in order to safeguard not only
their national interests, but global citizens’ rights to a productive environment and life itself. Not
only does this signal the need for full transitions away from fossil fuels, but climate change and
its serious human rights impacts should also signal a need to critically examine our economic
system of global industrial capitalism.
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Figures

Figure 1. Arctic oil exploration and production by nations claiming ownership over current and
undiscovered petroleum reserves in the Arctic region. Current production is depicted by red dots
while areas with high likelihood of undiscovered petroleum reserves are shaded in light red.
Countries involved in the race for Arctic oil development include Russia, Canada, the US,
Norway, and to a lesser degree, Iceland, Greenland, and Denmark (Source: Copeland, B., &
Watkins, D. (2013). Who Owns the Arctic (Sources: American Association of Petroleum Geologists,
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, International Boundaries Research Unit at Durham University,
Energy Information Administration, Klima Campus Integrated Climate Data Center, US Geological
Survey). New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/08/opinion/sunday/rushing -for-thearctics-riches.html).

Figure 2. Norwegian government revenue from petroleum production from the beginning of petroleum
production in 1971 to projected revenue values for 2021. The sources of State revenue from oil
production include taxes, environmental carbon taxes, income from SDFI, holdings in Equinor, and other
royalty fees. Government revenues from petroleum activities are invested into the Norwegian Sovereign
Wealth Fund, colloquially referred to as the Oil Fund, which ensures that future generations have access
to the economic benefits of oil production (Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. (2020, February
12). Norwegian Petroleum: Economy. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/economy/governments-revenues/).

Figure 3. All current oil and gas production licenses issued by the Norwegian government are shown in
grey. There are three main petroleum production regions: Production around the Southeastern tip or
Norway in the North Sea, production in the Norwegian sea, and production in the South/Southeast
Barents Sea in the Arctic region of Norway. Current legal controversy surrounds continued exploration
and licensure for production in the South/Southeast Barents Sea. With large undiscovered reserves of oil
and gas in the Barents Sea, production will likely continue to grow off the northern coast of Norway
despite the issues of climate change and difficult Arctic conditions.

